This paper considers a multi-person discrete game with random payoffs. The distribution of the random payoff is unknown to the players and further none of the players know the strategies or the actual moves of other players. A class of absolutely expedient learning algorithms for the game based on a decentralised team of Learning Automata is presented. These algorithms correspond, in some sense, to rational behaviour on the part of the players. All stable stationary points of the algorithm are shown to be Nash equilibria for the game. It is also shown that under some additional constraints on the game, the team will always converge to a Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with a learning problem in a general multiperson stochastic game with incomplete information. We study a class of decentralised algorithms for learning Nash equilibria. For this purpose, we employ team concepts associated with Learning Automata models [13] .
The game we consider is a discrete stochastic game played by N players. Each of the players has finitely many actions one of which he plays at each instant. After each play, the payoffs to individual players are random variables. The objective for each player is to maximise his expected payoff. Further, the game is one of incomplete information [6] . Thus, nothing is known regarding the distributions of the random payoffs. For learning optimal strategies, the game is palyed repeatedly. We are interested in (asymptotically) learning equilibrium strategies, in the sense of Nash, with respect to the expected value of the payoff. Our interest will be in decentralised learning algorithms. Hence, after each play, each of the players updates his strategy based solely on his current action or move and his payoff. None of the players has any information regarding the other players. As a matter of fact, none of the players need to even know the existence of other players. Thus the game we tackle is also of imperfect information [6] .
Such games are useful in tackling problems in many areas such as decentralised control, optimisation, pattern recognition and computer vision. Some of the applications of the game model considered in this paper are discussed in [14] . In many such problems Nash equilibria, in fact, represent the desired solutions. (For a good discussion on the rationality of Nash equilibria see [4, Ch. 2]).
We use a team of learning automata [13] for evolving to the optimal strategies. Games of learning automata have been used as models for adaptive decision making V V Phansalkar et al in many applications [17, 15, 18] . In Learning Automata theory, algorithms for learning optimal strategies have been developed for many special types of finite stochastic games. Some of the models considered are: Two-person zero-sum games [9] , N-person games with common payoff [17, 16, 20] and non-cooperative games such as Prisoner's Dilemma and Stackelberg games [19] . In [14] , it is shown that a team of Learning Automata involved in a general N-person stochastic game will converge to a Nash Equilibrium if each of the team members makes use of a linear algorithm called the LR-~ algorithm [13] . This requires that every member of the team has to use the same algorithm (though may be with different learning parameters). While this may be useful for applications such as optimization, for general N-person games (that include non-cooperative games) this is a restrictive condition. Here, we expand the earlier result [14] to a case where different players use different algorithms (not necessarily linear) though we require that every player satisfy the the 'absolute expediency' property [13] . Informally speaking the learning algorithm used by a player is absolutely expedient if the algorithm ensures that the expected value of his payoff will increase montonically with time (when all the other players play to a fixed strategy). We feel that this is a reasonable restriction because, assuming rational behaviour, each player should try to increase his payoff.
We begin by formulating the learning problem in w Section 3 gives a brief introduction to the necessary ideas from Learning Automata theory. Section 4 presents the learning algorithm and its analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results presented in the paper.
Problem formulation
In this section we introduce our notation and derive a few results regarding Nash equilibria which will be used later on in the analysis of our algorithm. Most of the formulation in this section can be found ill any standard book on Game Theory (e.g., [5,Z 7] ).
Consider a N-person stochastic game. Each player i has a finite set of actions or pure strategies, St, 1 ~< i ~ N. Let cardinality of St be m~, 1 ~< i ~< N. (It may be noted that the sets St, 1 ~< i ~< N, need not have any common elements and we assume no structure on these sets). Each play of the game consists of each of the players choosing an action. The result of each play is a random payoff to each player. Let r~ denote the random payoffto player i, 1 ~< i ~< N. It is assumed that r~e[0, 1]. Define functions (1)
The function d ~ is called the payoff function or utility function of player i, 1 ~< i ~ N. The objective of each player is to maximise his payoff. A strategy for player i is defined to be a probability vector q~ = [q, ..... q~m]', where player i chooses action j with probability qo-The strategy of a player can be time varying as it would be, for example, during learning. Each of the pure strategies or actions of the ith player can be considered as a strategy. Let e~ be a unit probability vector (of appropriate dimension) with ith component unity and all others zero. Then e~ is the strategy corresponding to the action i. (It may be noted that any unit probability vector
